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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights–African Charter on Democracy, Election
and Good Governance–right to freedom of association–right to non-discrimination and free
practice of religion
HOUNGUE ÉRIC NOUDEHOUENOU V. REPUBLIC OF BENIN. App. No. 003/2020. At
https://www.african-court.org/en/images/Cases/Judgment/003-2020
Houngue_Eric_Noudehouenou_v_Benin-_Judgment.pdf
Afr. Ct. H.P.R., December 3, 2020.
The judgment in Houngue Éric Noudehouenou v. Republic of Benin1 adds to the growing body of
human rights jurisprudence on national electoral processes in Africa’s international courts.2 Mr.
Houngue Noudehouenou’s (“Houngue”) case was sparked by a series of amendments to the 1990
Constitution of the Republic of Benin (“Benin”), Law No. 2019-40 (“the Revised Constitution”),
and changes to the Benin’s electoral law.3 Houngue argued that the cumulative effect of the
amendments violated his right to stand for election in the upcoming 2021 presidential election as
an independent candidate, as well as his right to freedom of expression, and freedom of association.
The decision demonstrates the growing importance of Africa’s regional and sub-regional courts as
an alternative venue for opposition politicians, activists, and citizens to mobilize and challenge
election processes and constitutional amendment processes where the playing field in their state is
uneven. In turn, it reinforces the pivotal role of the regional and sub-regional courts in
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consolidating democratic governance in Africa, and reveals the limits of assessing the performance
of Africa’s international courts solely on conventional measures of effectiveness and compliance.4
The African Court’s decision arrives in the shadow of Benin’s socio-political crisis, and only a
few months before the April 2021 presidential elections. Houngue’s case also needs to be situated
in the context of the country’s recent parliamentary and municipal elections. Benin is one of first
States in Africa to introduce multiparty elections. However, Benin’s electoral success5 and
democratic health has slipped since President Patrice Talon took power in 2016.6 Under President
Talon’s watch, Benin has grown increasingly repressive: free speech has been curtailed, and
intimidation of political opponents has increased (including the detention of the former president,
Thomas Boni Yayi).7
In 2018, Houngue was arrested and charged with embezzling public funds. In March 2019 the
Investigating Committee of the Court for the Repression of Economic Crimes and Terrorism
(CRIET) referred him to the Correctional Chamber of that Court with a new charge for complicity
in the abuse of office. He was convicted, and on July 25, 2019 he was sentenced to ten years
imprisonment. The detention which led to Houngue’s conviction before the CRIET is illustrative
of a wider crackdown against opposition politicians in Benin. Indeed, the delegitimization of the
opposition is a common strategy among incumbent political figures in Africa.8
Under the new electoral system ushered in by the Revised Constitution and amended electoral
code, political parties must pay 249 million CFA francs (approximately $400,000) to field
candidates in parliamentary elections. In addition, parties have to secure 10 percent of the total
national vote to enter the legislature, forcing local parties to build a national presence. The only
two parties that met the criteria to win seats in Parliament in 2019 – the Republican Bloc and the
Progressive Union – were both loyal to the president. The stringent eligibility criteria created
additional hurdles making it more difficult for opposition parties to field candidates. While
4
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President Talon argued that a tougher threshold would enhance Benin’s fragmented Parliament,
critics including Mr. Noudehouenou condemned the move as constricting free association and
participation in democratic governance.
The municipal elections of May 2020 continued the democratic erosion in Benin, further shrinking
space for political opposition.9 The elections were conducted amidst protests by many Beninese
and during the COVID-19 pandemic. The only opposition party to participate – Forces Cauris
pour un Bénin Emergent (FCBE) – won a majority in seven out of Benin’s 77 municipalities. These
municipal elections have direct consequences for the presidential election slated for April 2021.10
Pursuant to Article 44 of the Revised Constitution which was passed by a national assembly
(composed solely of elected representatives of the party in power), presidential and vicepresidential candidates are required to be sponsored by at least 16 parliamentarians and/or mayors.
From the foregoing, it is evident that the April 2021 Presidential elections would be conducted in
the shadow of an executive intolerant of opposition, questionable parliamentary elections, and
dubious independence of the Constitutional Court and electoral commission.
After the case was filed, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“African Court”)
ordered provisional measures in favour of Houngue on two separate occasions. The operative part
of the African Court’s first provisional measure were two: first, that Benin stay the execution of
the CRIET decision until it pronounced its own final judgment; second, that Benin report on the
implementation of the preceding order within 15 days.11 The second interim measure was
prompted by Benin’s failure to comply with the order arising from the first provisional measure,
and required Benin to take all necessary measures to effectively remove any administrative,
judicial, and political obstacles to Houngue’s candidacy in the forthcoming elections. 12
In the substantive arguments before the African Court, Houngue alleged, inter alia, a violation of
his right to appeal the CRIET judgment under Articles 10, Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR), 7(1)(a) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Charter), and 2(3) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).13 Houngue argued that by requiring
Beninese citizens to vote only for candidates chosen and endorsed by political parties, Art. 153-1
of the Revised Constitution violates the right to freedom of expression as enshrined in Article
19(2) of the ICCPR. Further, he argued that Benin’s actions violated various regional and
international human rights instruments protecting the freedoms of association and expression, and
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the right to non-discrimination.14 In his request for relief, Houngue asked the African Court for an
order mandating that Benin take all necessary constitutional, legislative, and associated measures
to end these alleged violations in advance of the forthcoming elections, and report to the Court.
Benin argued that that the Court lacked jurisdiction to scrutinize or annul its Constitution and
electoral Code. In the alternative, the government contended that the matter was inadmissible as
Houngue lacked the locus standi to initiate the proceeding. Lastly, Benin asked for a declaration
that it did not violate any of Houngue’s human rights.
In its judgment, the African Court held that it had material jurisdiction over the case. It was enough
that the human rights violations arose out of the Charter and other international human rights
instruments ratified by Benin. Further, the Court found that Houngue had exhausted local remedies
and fulfilled the conditions for admissibility.
The Court made four findings on alleged human rights violations. First, it found that Benin did not
violate Houngue’s right to an effective remedy. Second, however, it did find that Benin violated
its obligation under Art 10(2) of the African Charter on Democracy, Election and Good
Governance (ACDEG) because Benin’s constitutional amendment process was not based on
national consensus.15 Notably, “[t]he fact that the Revised Constitution was passed unanimously
cannot conceal the need for national consensus driven by the ‘ideals that prevailed during the
adoption of the Constitution of 11 December 1990’ and … the ACDEG.”16 Third, in view of
Benin’s non-compliance with the ACDEG process for the amendment of the Constitution, the
African court found it was unnecessary to rule on the alleged violations of rights to participate in
public affairs, equality, freedom of association, freedom of religion and expression as envisaged
under the Revised Constitution. According to the Court, ‘it is superfluous to give a detailed ruling
on violations that would result from any of the revised articles because the Constitutional revision
as a whole violates Article 10(2) of the ACDEG.’17 Fourth, the Court found that Benin violated
the right of Houngue to be presumed innocent under Article 11 of the UDHR and Article 13(3) of
the Charter. Consequently, the African Court ordered Benin to take all measures to repeal the law
revising the 1990 Constitution and all subsequent laws relating to the election pursuant to that
revision in order to guarantee that its citizens, including Houngue, participate freely in the
forthcoming presidential election.
***
A paramount outcome of the remedy ordered by the African Cout is the declaration that the process
leading to the constitutional revision in Benin was invalid. While Houngue did not seek a monetary
remedy, the African Court’s order that Benin “take all necessary measures to ensure cessation of
all effects of the constitutional revision and the violations which the court found” is an
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unprecedented step in the Court’s jurisprudence on remedies.18 In this context, Houngue’s case not
only reinforces the bold position of the African Court in indicating that constitutional changes may
be required to give effect to its judgments, but also broadens the nature of the remedy that it issues.
To understand the broader socio-political and legal context of Houngue’s case, one has to see it as
part of a wider and growing mobilization of the African Court by opposition politicians as an
alternative forum for engaging in political warfare against repressive national governments and for
mobilizing social movements.19 Like its sister sub-regional courts, the African Court does not have
jurisdiction to review election disputes arising out of political processes in its Member States.20
However, for over a decade, political stakeholders and civil society actors have transformed
Africa’s sub-regional courts into alternative fora for resistance and protest against their
governments.21 Opposition politicians and dissidents have utilized the supranational human rights
complaint as a lever to judicialize election disputes. Such strategic human rights litigation before
the African Court in particular is on the rise.
The strategic litigation of human rights violations arising from electoral processes provides a tool
in the pursuit of social change. This strategy is most obviously employed by opposition parties and
candidates, like Houngue. Pro-democracy and civil society groups have also increasingly turned
to human rights litigation in Africa’s regional and sub-regional courts as a form of activism aimed
at consolidating democratic governance. All this is redefining the boundaries of the dockets of
these courts.22
The openness of Africa’s regional and sub-regional courts to these sorts of disputes enhances the
wider socio-political opportunities of pro-democracy activists and civil society. The rationale for
the judicialization of political disputes arising from electoral processes or constitutional
amendments relating to the law of democracy is not simply about emerging victorious in the
particular case. Political disputes are judicialized in the African Court as a means of mobilizing
social change, diversity of opposition voices in politics, and defense of political freedom. Even
where Applicants lose the case, strategic litigation can have significant instrumental value.23 For
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example, through coordinated efforts with the media, litigants use such cases to launch campaigns
to pressure their governments to act as a law-abiding member of the international community.24
However, strategic human rights litigation can also have negative consequences for the ability of
non-state litigants to access the African Court.25 The growing litigation of high-profile political
disputes before that court occurs, after all, in the shadow of executive consolidation and
intimidation. Successful invocations of the human rights framework have already generated
consequential reactions by Member States – including the withdrawal of optional declarations
granting individuals and NGOs direct access to the African Court.26 Mr. Noudehouenou’s case
was no exception. On March 25, 2020, shortly after its defeat, Benin withdrew its declaration
granting individuals direct access to the Court. Benin argued that the Court exceeded its
jurisdiction in intervening in its sovereign constitutional matters.27 (Benin’s withdrawal will not
be effective until March 2021 and would neither affect pending cases nor prevent new cases from
being filed before then).
The judgment in Houngue Éric Noudehouenou v. Republic of Benin contributes to the density of
mega-political jurisprudence of Africa’s regional and sub-regional courts—a term meant to
capture high profile cases arising from national electoral processes, electoral procedures, good
governance and the rule of law, constitutional and electoral law amendments, and regime change.28
These disputes are always embedded in broader national socio-political contestations. The strength
of mega-political disputes lies in their instrumental and non-material value and the changes that
they prompt. These cases are instrumental in every phase, as they present the litigants with
sustained leverage to pressure the government through the media.
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Looking forward, to consolidate and maximize the socio-political benefits of the opportunities
created by mega-political disputes for social movements, litigants and activists must coordinate
and cross-fertilize the jurisprudence of the African Court and other sub-regional courts. For
example, in the context of the Economic Community of West African States Court of Justice
(ECOWAS Court), the Ugokwe doctrine sets an important precedent defining the circumstances
in which election disputes come under its jurisdiction.29 It asserts that even if the legal texts
applicable to the relevant Court
‘… confer no general or specific power to adjudicate election disputes or matters arising
therefrom, in appropriate cases, the [ECOWAS] Court will assume jurisdiction where the
determination of the human rights of the parties are intertwined with mega-political
disputes.’30
Intentionally cross-incorporating the wider mega-politics jurisprudence of the different regional
and sub-regional courts would enhance their role as actors in norm-generation and development
of their own common law.31 Professional organizations can collaborate with civil rights groups
and pro-democracy advocates to advance the norms of socio-political movement in pursuit of legal
reforms and social change. For example, the work of the Pan African Lawyers Union (PALU)
illustrates the role that professional organizations can play in supporting public interest and
strategic litigation with a view to not only cross-fertilizing the jurisprudence of the courts, but also,
bringing valuable knowledge, skills, and experience to mega-politics disputes before the court.32
In this regard, the density of the mega-political decisions bodes well for the consolidation of
strategic litigations as a tool for social and political mobilization.
In conclusion, Houngue Éric Noudehouenou v. Republic of Benin shows the growing strategy that
opposition politicians and political parties adopt in mobilizing legal reforms through social
movements before the African regional and sub-regional courts. The strategic nature of the
litigation does not map on to the traditional narratives about the implementation and effectiveness
of international judicial decisions. Yet, it is effective in an important way. Based on strategically
orchestrated international and national media attention, litigants can bring extraordinary pressure
on national governments. To avoid ‘naming and shaming’ in national and international media, an
otherwise authoritarian executive may allow legal reforms to proceed.33 It is too early to say how
Mr. Noudehouenou’s case will end. But it tends to illustrate how strategic litigation of megapolitical cases in Africa’s regional and sub-regional courts is growing in importance as a tool for
socio-political movements and ultimately as a driver for legal and political reform.
Olabisi D. Akinkugbe
Schulich School of Law
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